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 MCI will refer to the arguments made in the Brief of Respondents 
Public Service Commission of Utah, Division of Public U t i l i t i e s and the 
Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company as those of "Mountain 
B e l l . " 
reject the Request for Agency Action. Specifically, Mountain 
Bell argues that the rule against retroactive ratemaking, as 
stated in Utah Dep't of Bus. Reg. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 720 
P.2d 420 (Utah 1986) bars any order of reparations for unjust 
or unreasonable rates. MCI does not dispute that the rule 
against retroactive ratemaking has been adopted in Utah, but 
points to specific statutory and judicial exceptions to the 
rule that are applicable in these circumstances. 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-20 creates an exception to the 
rule where the Commission determines that a utility has 
charged an unjust or unreasonable rate. Mountain Bell's argu-
ment that the Court should ignore the plain language of the 
statute is not consistent with applicable rules of statutory 
construction or a common sense, application of the rule against 
retroactive ratemaking. Contrary to Mountain Bell's argument, 
American Salt Co. v. W.S. Hatch Co., 748 P.2d 1060 (Utah 1987) 
does not require that the Request for Agency Action be denied. 
Similarly, there is a commonly recognized exception 
to the rule against retroactive ratemaking where significant 
utility profits or losses result from extraordinary and 
unforeseen events. This exception has been applied to allow 
utilities to recover unforeseen tax expenses and is equally 
applicable to the corporate tax cut enacted in 1986. 
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ARGUMENT 
I • St a.yuan or review :n e Commission's Legal Interpreta-
tion of Decisions bv the Utah Supreme Court and Other 
Courts is Entitled to Mo Deference. 
MCI concedes tna" tn*.s ~ •: e^-
mediiU- ..uu^oior. ZDP. ^ _ ~ s . ~s 3n 
mixed u^esc.J.cs c: : J - -. : - , -- ^ o r ^tations of 
"'r.6 OD6TV ' - f " ^ 1 ^  ^ ^  ' ^ p r n P^W~ 
Mountain States Te^. * lei. _yJL__ Public 
Serv. Comm1 nf 7 54 - an xr I ie 
Commission' - aeui; * arqumt to : .he 
pa r t: I e ^  * . ^  v v * - . *- M . ai^ 3 - c ~ - - a r - - ~ i s 
appeal — the scope .:! fl^ > I'H against re* r "M<' + I "^ r.i'^HUK i iig 
in '* ih i tl i ey »'i i i .' , hi iterpretat u n of Utah's utility 
statutes. 
i Apparently,- however,- at least some of the stai idards cited in Mountain 
States are no longer applicable. In Grace Drilling v. Bd. of Review, 776 
P.2d 63, 67 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), the Court of Appeals held that "the 
Supreme Court's landmark pronouncements concerning judicial review of 
administrative proceedings in Utah Dep't of Admin. Servs. v. Public Serv. 
Comm'n, 658 P.2d 601, 607-12 (Utah 1983)" nave been superseded by the 
provisions of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann. 
S 63-46b-1 r . See Williams v. Mountain States Tel, S» Tel. Co., 76 3 ?. 2d 
796, SCO n.l "Jtah 1988= < Durham, :., dissenting). Under the Administra-
tive Procedures Act, an appellate court may grant relief if "the agency itas 
erroneously interpreted or applied the law," or if "the agency action :s 
based upon a determination of fact, made .r relied cy the agency, that .s 
not supported by substantial evidence when viewed m light of the wncle 
record before the court." id. *> 6 3-46b-16(d> i g! . '^ Pro-Benefit 
Staffing Inc. v. Bd. of Review. ?.ld 4 J-?. 44; ut. ;t. App. 1989 
(intermediate stands". "^  '•'-' ••- apples *" ) mixed questions' cf" l = w azz 
fact). 
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While the rule against retroactive ratemaking may 
arguably be based in statute, the memoranda filed with the 
Commission by the parties and the briefs filed with the Court 
demonstrate that the application of the rule (and potential 
exceptions) cannot be determined by reference to Utah's 
utility statutes alone, but must also include an analysis of 
common law developed by various courts applying and interpret-
3 
ing the rule. Moreover, the Commission rejected the Request 
for Agency Action by relying exclusively on this Court's 
decision in Utah Dep't of Bus, Reg, v. Public Serv. Commfn, 
720 P.2d 420 (Utah 1986) (the "EBA Case"). In establishing 
standards of review for Commission decisions, this Court has 
not expressed a willingness to defer to the Commission1s 
interpretation of common law. Finally, deference to the 
Commission's decisions in this context is not required to 
achieve the purpose of the intermediate standard of review 
since interpretation of the common law associated with the 
rule against retroactive ratemaking does not depend on the 
"technical expertise or more extensive experience" of the 
Commission. See Utah Depft of Admin, Serv, v. Public Serv, 
Comm'n, 658 P.2d 601, 611 (Utah 1983), 
3
 Mountain Bell has even raised a Constitutional question regarding 
application of the rule against retroactive ratemaking. See Mountain Bell 
Brief, at 28. 
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MCI further submits that the standard of review is 
not determinative of this appeal, for under either standard, 
the Commission's decision must be reversed. The Commission's 
order denying the Request for Agency Action is directly at 
odds with the plain language of Utah Code Ann, S 54-7-20 and 
is therefore outside the "tolerable limits of reason.11 
Mountain States, 754 P.2d at 930. 
II. All Issues Before the Commission Are Part of This Appeal 
and Are Properly Before the Court, 
Mountain Bell argues that the question of Mountain 
Bell's actions to conceal the rate impact of the 86 Tax Act 
cannot be considered on appeal because it was not raised by 
the Resellers on rehearing before the Commission. Mountain 
Bell Brief, at 20. Mountain Bell is simply incorrect. In 
seeking rehearing of the Commission's order, Petitioner 
Tel-America raised the question of Mountain Bell's conduct in 
at least two instances. See Tel-America Petition for Rehear-
ing, at 4 (The Commission's Order "rewards Mountain Bell for 
failing to immediately bring the existence of its overearnings 
to the attention of the Commission in order to rectify the 
situation.") (R. at 688); UL_ at 7 ("Mountain Bell should be 
required to give up that which it should not have collected in 
the first instance and would not have collected if Mountain 
Bell had immediately brought the matter to the Commission's 
-5-
a t t e n t i o n , " ) (R. a t 691) . MCI jo ined in , and incorpora ted by 
r e f e r e n c e , the arguments of Tel-America. See P e t i t i o n of MCI 
Telecommunication Corp. for Review or Rehearing (R. a t 695) . 
In r e a l i t y , MCIfs r eques t t h a t t h i s a c t i on be 
remanded for an i n v e s t i g a t i o n of Mountain B e l l ' s r a t e s and 
conduct i s s imply a reques t t h a t the Commission be ordered to 
comply wi th Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-20 . Such a reques t was 
c l e a r l y r e f l e c t e d in the p e t i t i o n s for r ehea r ing of both 
p a r t i e s . (R. a t 690, 695) . If t h i s Court de termines t h a t 
the Commission has the a u t h o r i t y to o rder r e p a r a t i o n s for 
unjust or unreasonable r a t e s and o r d e r s the Commission t o 
comply with the s t a t u t e , then the Commission must i n v e s t i g a t e 
a l l a s p e c t s of the Request for Agency Act ion, inc lud ing 
Mountain B e l l ' s conduct . 
4
 Mountain Be l l ' s claim that MCI and Tel-America did not ra i se the 
question of Mountain Bel l ' s conduct before the Commission i s erroneous. 
See e .g . , Reply Memorandum of MCI In Support of I t s Request for Agency 
Action, a t 1-3, 18. (R. at 653-55, 670). 
5
 In the decisions ci ted by Mountain Bell , Hi-Country Homeowners Ass'n 
v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 779 P.2d 682 (Utah 1989), Williams v. Public Serv. 
Comm'n, 754 P.2d 41 (Utah 1988), and Utah Dep't of Bus. Reg, v. Public 
Serv. Comm'n, 602 P.2d 696 (Utah 1979), pe t i t ioners failed to comply with 
the requirement of Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-15(2) and f i led no pe t i t ion for 
rehearing with the Commission. In contras t , both MCI and Tel-America f i led 
timely pe t i t ions for rehearing which asked the Commission to reconsider i t s 
decisions on a l l aspects of the Request for Agency Action. Accordingly, 
a l l issues before the Commission, including Mountain Bel l ' s conduct, are 
properly before the Court. 
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Ill. Granting Reparations to Mountain Bell Ratepayers Will Not 
Violate the Rule Against Retroactive Ratemakinq. 
MCI does not dispute that most jurisdictions have 
adopted, either by statute or judicial decision, the rule 
against retroactive ratemaking. Nor does MCI dispute that 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-4(1) establishes, as a general princi-
ple, that utility rates must be set prospectively, or that the 
EBA Case recognized that the rule against retroactive 
ratemaking is applicable in Utah. MCIfs argument is simply 
that the rule against retroactive ratemaking is not immutable, 
but is subject to a broad variety of statutory and judicial 
exceptions. MCI asks only that this Court apply the rule, as 
have many other courts, with "equity and common sense." MGTC, 
Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 735 P.2d 103, 107 (Wyo. 1987) 
(quoting Roberts v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 470 A.2d 215, 217 
(R.I. 1984)). 
In particular, Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-20 establishes 
a statutory exception to the rule against retroactive 
ratemaking that allows the Commission to order reparations 
after an investigation and finding that unjust, unreasonable 
or discriminatory rates have been charged. In the 
6
 Mountain Bell recently made a similar argument before the Commission 
in its memorandum in opposition to Tel-America's motion for immediate 
refund in Case No. 83-999-11, when it stated that "the rule against 
retroactive ratemaking has equitable exceptions and is not a fast, 
intractable rule.M See R. at 662. 
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alternative, the circumstances of this Request for Agency 
Action justify application of one of the judicially created 
exceptions to the rule against retroactive ratemaking. The 
Commission prematurely determined, without an investigation, 
that no exceptions to the general rule were applicable. 
A, An Order of Reparations Would Not Violate Mountain 
BellTs Due Process Rights or Constitute a Confisca-
tory Taking. 
Mountain Bell argues that the rule against retroac-
tive ratemaking is grounded in constitutional due process 
considerations. While there is typically a due process 
concern with legislative or judicial actions that upset 
economic expectations, Mountain Bell's argument significantly 
overstates the Constitutional claim by omitting the Constitu-
tional test for legislative action. Legislative acts meet due 
process concerns where the retroactive action is justified by 
a rational legislative purpose. 
It is by now well established that legis-
lative Acts adjusting the burdens and 
benefits of economic life come to the 
Court with a presumption of constitution-
ality, and that the burden is on one 
complaining of a due process violation to 
establish that the legislature has acted 
in an arbitrary and irrational way. 
[Legislation readjusting rights and 
burdens is not unlawful solely because it 
upsets otherwise settled expectations. 
This is true even though the effect of the 
legislation is to impose a new duty or 
liability based on past acts. 
-8-
Usery v . Turner Elkhorn Mining Co. , 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976) . 
See a l s o Pension Benef i t Guaranty Corp. v . R.A. Gray & Co. , 
467 U.S. 717, 730 (1984) (Due process i s s a t i s f i e d "simply by 
showing t h a t the r e t r o a c t i v e a p p l i c a t i o n of the l e g i s l a t i o n i s 
j u s t i f i e d by a r a t i o n a l l e g i s l a t i v e p u r p o s e . " ) . 
The Utah L e g i s l a t u r e has au thor i zed the Commission 
to o rder r e p a r a t i o n s where a u t i l i t y has charged u n j u s t , 
unreasonable or d i s c r i m i n a t o r y r a t e s . Utah Code Ann. 
§ 54-7-20. The purpose of t h a t p rov i s ion i s to provide 
r a t e p a y e r s and the Commission a mechanism to enforce the 
genera l requirement of U t a h ' s u t i l i t y code t h a t a l l u t i l i t y 
charges must be j u s t and r ea sonab l e . Utah Code Ann. S 5 4 - 3 - 1 . 
Moreover, s ince Utah law d e c l a r e s t h a t " [ e ]ve ry unjus t or 
unreasonable charge made, demanded or rece ived . . . i s hereby 
p r o h i b i t e d and dec l a red un lawful , " id . , Mountain Bel l can 
hard ly be heard to claim a ves ted i n t e r e s t in the proceeds of 
an unlawful r a t e . No u t i l i t y has a ves ted r i g h t to exceed i t s 
au tho r i zed r a t e of r e t u r n or to charge excess ive r a t e s . See 
In re Na r r aqanse t t , 57 Pub. U t i l . Rep. 4th (PUR) 549, 559 
( R . I . Pub. U t i l . Comm. 1984) . 
7
 For example, in In re Central Vt. Public Serv. Corp,, 144 Vt. 46, 473 
A.2d 1155 (1984), cited by Mountain Bell Brief, at 29, the Court recited 
the due process concerns raised by Mountain Bell, but held only that 
"unless authorized by statute, a rate that requires consumers to pay for 
past deficits of a u t i l i ty or that requires a u t i l i ty to refund to 
consumers a portion of i t s previously earned profits constitutes i l legal 
retroactive ratemaking." IcL at 1160 (emphasis added). 
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B. The Commission May Order a Refund of Earnings in 
Excess of the Applicable Rate of Return Without 
Violating the Rule Against Retroactive Ratemaking. 
In its opening brief, MCI argued that, in addition 
to the authority to order reparations under Utah Code Ann, 
§ 54-7-20, the Commission has the authority to enforce its 
1985 general rate order and limit Mountain Bell's return on 
equity to 14.2%. Opening Brief of Petitioner MCI Telecommuni-
cation Corp., at 46-49 (nMCI Opening Brief"). Mountain Bell 
responds that such an order would violate the rule against 
retroactive ratemaking and attempts to distinguish the author-
ity relied on by MCI, Narragansett Elec. Co. v. Burke, 505 
A.2d 1147 (R.I. 1986) . 
First, Mountain Bell argues that the Rhode Island 
ratemaking statute considered in Narragansett lacks a provi-
sion stating that rates will be "thereafter" in force. 
Mountain Bell Brief, at 37. The distinction is meaningless, 
however, as the Rhode Island Supreme Court has adopted the 
rule against retroactive ratemaking even in the absence of 
that statutory phrase. See New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. 
Public Util. Comm'n, 116 R.I. 356, 358 A.2d 1, 20 (1976) ("A 
fundamental rule of ratemaking is that rates are exclusively 
prospective in nature."). Rhode Island, like Utah, recognizes 
the rule against retroactive ratemaking, but has determined 
that enforcement of a rate of return specified in a prior rate 
order does not violate the rule. 
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Second, Mountain Bell points to Rhode Island's 
"liberal" refund statute. Mountain Bell Brief, at 37. A 
careful analysis of the Rhode Island refund statute, however, 
demonstrates that it is not dramatically different from Utah's 
reparations statute. The Rhode Island statute provides as 
follows: 
The division shall have the power, when 
deemed by it necessary to provide remedial 
relief from unjust, unreasonable or 
discriminatory acts, or from any matter, 
act or thing done by a public utility 
which [is] declared to be unlawful, to 
order the public utility to make restitu-
tion to any party or parties, individually 
or as a class, injured by said prohibited 
or unlawful acts, by way of a cash refund, 
billing credit or rate adjustment, or any 
other form of relief which the division 
may devise to do equity to the parties. 
R.I. Gen. Laws S 39-3-13.1 (1984). In other words, Rhode 
Island utility regulators may order reparations when a utility 
charges an unjust, unreasonable or discriminatory rate, or 
engages in unlawful or prohibited behavior. The Rhode Island 
statute provides more discretion in fashioning a remedy, but 
Utah law provides the Commission with the same substantive 
responsibility and power. 
Finally, Mountain Bell claims that Rhode Island "is 
a national anomaly in recognizing a wide variety of exceptions 
to the rule against retroactive ratemaking." Mountain Bell 
Brief, at 37. If Mountain Bell is saying that Rhode Island 
has the most decisions and the most developed reasoning on 
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exceptions to the rule against retroactive ratemaking, MCI 
agrees. But the exception for extraordinary and unforeseen 
events is not limited to Rhode Island. See MCI Opening Brief, 
at 38-41. Such an exception has been recognized in many 
Q 
j u r i s d i c t i o n s , including Iowa, Miss iss ippi , Vermont, and 
9 Wisconsin. See also Narraqansett Elec. Co. v. Burke, 415 
A.2d 177, 179-80 (R. I . 1980) (c i t ing "exception" cases from 
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Kansas, Maryland, Massachu-
s e t t s , Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York and 
Pennsylvania). In fac t , the vast majority of j u r i s d i c t i o n s 
that have considered an exception for extraordinc and 
unforeseen circumstances have adopted such an exception. Far 
from being an anomaly, Rhode Island is squarely in the main-
stream on th i s quest ion. The. Utah Supreme Court has not yet 
considered exceptions to the rule against r e t roac t ive 
ratemaking, and MCI believes that the be t t e r reasoned 
8
 The Vermont decision, In re Green Mountain Power Corp., 147 Vt. 509, 
519 A.2d 595, 597-99 (1986) i s pa r t i cu la r ly noteworthy because the Vermont 
Supreme Court has adopted the rule against re t roac t ive ratemaking in very 
strong terms. See In re Central Vermont Public Serv. Corp., 144 Vt. 46, 
473 A.2d 1155 (1984) (ci ted by Mountain Bell Brief, at 29). Yet the 
Vermont court l a te r recognized the necessity of an exception in appropriate 
circumstances. See MCI Opening Brief, at 38 & n.20. 
9
 As in Vermont, courts in Wisconsin have adopted the rule against 
re t roac t ive ratemaking, see Kimberly Clark Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 
110 Wis.2d 455, 329 N.W.2d 143 (1983) (ci ted by Mountain Bell Brief, at 36 
n.25) and the exception for extraordinary and unforeseen events. See 
Wisconsin's Environmental Decade, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 98 Wis.2d 
682, 298 N.W.2d 205, 212 (Ct. App. 1980). See MCI Opening Brief, at 37. 
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authority should persuade the Court to adopt an exception in 
this case. 
C. The Commission May Order Reparat ions of Unjust or 
Unreasonable Rates Without V io la t ing the Rule 
Against Re t roac t i ve Ratemaking. 
Mountain Bell argues t h a t Utah ' s r e p a r a t i o n s s t a t u t e 
i s i n a p p l i c a b l e to the c i rcumstances of t h i s c a s e . Mountain 
Bel l Br ief , a t 38-48. Mountain B e l l ' s primary argument i s 
t h a t the r e p a r a t i o n s p r o v i s i o n s of s ec t i on 54-7-20 cannot be 
r econc i l ed with the genera l language of s e c t i o n 54-4-4 t h a t 
u t i l i t y r a t e s a re f ,to be t h e r e a f t e r observed and in f o r c e . " 
Mountain Bel l Brief , a t 47-48 . Mountain B e l l ' s argument i s 
c o n t r a r y to the e s t a b l i s h e d r u l e s of s t a t u t o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n 
c i t e d by both p a r t i e s . See MCI Opening Brief , a t 28, n.14 
( c i t i n g Durfey v . Bd. of Ed. of Wayne County, 604 P.2d 480, 
484 (Utah 1979)) and Mountain Bel l Brief , a t 48 ( c i t i n g In re 
Utah Savings and Loan Ass ' n , 21 Utah 2d 169, 442 P.2d 929 
(1968) ) . 
As MCI expla ined in i t s opening b r i e f , s e c t i o n 
54-4-4 e s t a b l i s h e s a gene ra l r u l e p r o s c r i b i n g r e t r o a c t i v e 
1 0
 The Court should also carefully consider the argument made by 
Mountain Bell at p . 48, n.32. Mountain Bell urges the Court to dismiss 
Tel-America's unjust enrichment claim because "the common law r ight to 
r e s t i t u t i on has been subsumed by reparations or stay pending appeal 
s t a tu tes - " IcL According to Mountain Bell, "Utah has both types of 
s ta tu tes which more than adequately protect rate payers in appropriate 
circumstances." IdL At the same time, however, Mountain Bell i s urging 
the Court to effectively read the reparations s ta tute out of existence. 
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ratemaking. In section 54-7-20, the Legislature adopted 
certain express exceptions to that general rule and procedures 
whereby ratepayers could invoke those exceptions. Pursuant to 
those provisions, a ratepayer may request that the Commission 
investigate utility rates that are alleged to be (1) in excess 
of the rates on file with the Commission, or, (2) unjust, 
unreasonable or discriminatory. If, after investigation, the 
Commission finds that those allegations are substantiated, it 
may order reparations. The second subsection of section 
54-7-20 provides a bifurcated statute of limitations: com-
plaints concerning charges in excess of approved rates must be 
brought within two years, while ratepayers have only one year 
to file a complaint concerning unjust, unreasonable or dis-
criminatory rates. The reconciliation of the statutory 
language that Mountain Bell urges would render both the 
reparations provision and the statute of limitations meaning-
less, contrary to the Court's direction in Durfey, 604 P.2d at 
484. In contrast, the reading that MCI urges — that repara-
tions for unreasonable rates are simply an exception to the 
general rule of prospective ratemaking--comports fully with 
the Court's direction in Utah Savings and Loan Assfn. MCIfs 
reading would "giv[e each provision] its intended effect 
insofar as that can be accomplished without nullifying the 
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o t h e r . " Utah Savings and Loan Ass'n, 442 P.2d at 931-32 
(footnote omi t ted) . 
Mountain Bell also r e l i e s on American Sal t Co. v. 
VI.S. Hatch Co., 748 P.2d 1060 (Utah 1987) to support i t s 
argument tha t the Commission has no au thor i ty to grant repara-
t ions where a u t i l i t y has charged unjust or unreasonable 
r a t e s . The American Sal t case and t h i s case come to the Court 
in very d i f f e ren t pos tu res . In American S a l t , a complaint was 
f i l e d with the Commission, the Commission inves t iga ted the 
complaint , concluded tha t the r a t e charged was j u s t and 
12 reasonable and refused to order r epa ra t ions . In the present 
case , MCI and others requested tha t the Commission inves t iga t e 
the reasonableness of Mountain B e l l ' s r a t e s in l igh t of the 86 
1 1
 The Court ' s footnote omitted by Mountain B e l l ' s quotation of Utah 
Savings and Loan Ass'n i s s ign i f i can t . The Court quoted Univ. of Utah v. 
Richards, 59 P. 96, 97 (Utah 1899): "One act i s not to be allowed to defeat 
another, if by reasonable construction the two can be made to stand 
toge ther . " At the r i sk of r e s t a t ing the obvious one more time, the only 
i n t e rp r e t a t i on of Utah Code Ann. S 54-7-20 that allows both provisions in 
i ssue to "stand together" i s the one urged by MCI. 
12 The Commission's order included two separate f indings. F i r s t , the 
Commission concluded tha t the f i led r a t e was just and reasonable. Order a t 
3, 14. Second, in response to the complaint, the Commission made a 
speci f ic conclusion of law that the r a t e was just and reasonable as 
appl ied . Order at 5, 14. This process may a lso be explained by the 
Cour t ' s conclusion that whether "a general t a r i f f i s just and reasonable 
under t i t l e 54 turns on many fac to rs , not on the facts surrounding a given 
shipment viewed in i s o l a t i o n . " American Sal t , 7 48 P.2d a t 1063. Thus, 
American S a l t ' s claim that the t a r i f f was unfair when applied to the 
speci f ic shipment at issue was not suff ic ient to demonstrate tha t the 
e n t i r e t a r i f f was unjust or unreasonable. In cont ras t , MCI and Tel-America 
claim tha t the r a t e s charged by Mountain Bell a f ter the 86 Tax Act were 
unreasonable in a l l circumstances. 
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Tax Act. The Commission denied that request, concluding that 
it had no authority to order reparations, and made no explicit 
11 finding concerning Mountain Bell's rates. 
MCI argues that American Salt does not govern the 
resolution of this appeal. Nevertheless, there is strong 
language in the American Salt decision regarding reparations 
and prospective ratemaking. If the Court is persuaded by 
Mountain Bell that American Salt is controlling, MCI urges the 
Court to carefully reconsider that decision. Two specific 
concerns should be kept in mind when evaluating the impact of 
American Salt. 
First, the reading of American Salt urged by Moun-
tain Bell would read part of the reparations statute out of 
existence. 
Second, in American Salt, the Court overlooked " the 
1929 amendment that expanded the statute to include repara-
tions for "unjust or unreasonable" rates. The Court relied on 
Denver & Rio Grande Railroad v. Public Util. Comm'n, 73 Utah 
139, 272 P. 939 (1928). As the Court explained, 
In Denver & Rio Grande Railroad v. Public 
Utilities Commission, the Public Utilities 
Commission, relying on language substan-
tively identical to section 54-7-20, 
ordered the petitioner/utility to pay 
reparations to a shipper. . . . [T]he 
*3 in fact, Mountain Bell concedes that the Commission "implicitly" 
found that the existing rates were unjust and unreasonable when it approved 
rate reductions and ordered new rates. Mountain Bell Brief, at 46. 
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Commission found the petitioner's higher 
tariff unreasonable and unjust and ordered 
the petitioner to make reparations* In 
reversing that order, this Court stated: 
We think it plain from the 
language of the statute that 
the power of the commission to 
order reparations is limited to 
cases where charges have been 
made in excess of the sched-
ules, rates, and tariffs on 
file with the commission, or 
discrimination made under such 
schedules. That was the view 
[previously] taken by the 
commission itself, and approved 
by this court. 
American Salt, 748 P.2d at 1064 (footnotes omitted). In 1929, 
the year after Denver & Rio Grande was decided, the Legisla-
ture amended the reparations statute to provide for repara-
tions where the public utility "has charged and unjust, 
unreasonable amount against the complainant." 1929 Utah Laws 
Ch. 43 (Attached as Exhibit A). While legislative intent is 
impossible to divine after sixty years, the amendment supports 
an argument that the Legislature added reparations for unjust 
or unreasonable rates to the statute in response to the ruling 
14 
of Denver & Rio Grande. In any event, the amendment to the 
statute demonstrates that the Court's statement in American 
14
 The Legislature left the language of subsection one virtually 
unchanged apart from adding "unjust" and "unreasonable" charges to the list 
of those that could justify an order of reparations. Cf^ 1917 Compiled 
Laws of Utah S 4838 (quoted in Denver & Rio Grande, 272 P. at 940) with 
1929 Utah Laws Ch. 43. 
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Sal t—that Denver & Rio Grande considered language "substan-
t ive ly iden t ica l" to sect ion 54-7-20—was incor rec t . The 
language is mater ia l ly d i f fe ren t with respect to the specif ic 
question at issue in t h i s appeal: whether the s t a t u t e autho-
r izes reparat ions for unjust or unreasonable r a t e s . 
Mountain Bell a lso argues that any ra tes approved by 
the Commission are , by de f in i t i on , jus t and reasonable and 
15 therefore not subject to repara t ions . Mountain Bell Brief, 
at 41-44. MCI agrees tha t Commission-approved ra tes are 
presumed to be jus t and reasonable. Nonetheless, the presump-
t ion may be overcome by a su i t ab le factual showing, a showing 
Pe t i t i one r s never were allowed to present because of the 
Commission's erroneous appl ica t ion of the EBA Case. 
1 5
 Mountain Bell claims that MCI assumes, without author i ty , that the 
ra tes charged by Mountain Bell were unjust and unreasonable. Mountain Bell 
Brief, at 41. Mountain Be l l ' s statement i s incorrec t . MCI has demon-
st ra ted at length, with numerous c i t a t ions to author i ty , that ra tes based 
on a 46% corporate income tax r a t e , when in fact the tax ra te was only 34%, 
were per se unreasonable. MCI Opening Brief, at 22-26; see, e .g . , Re 
In te r s t a t e Power Co., 81 Pub. U t i l . Rep. 4th (PUR) 471, 489 (Iowa Ut i l . Bd. 
1987) ("Failure to re f lec t the Congressionally determined tax ra te yields 
an unreasonable r e s u l t . The unreasonable resul t t r ans la tes into unjust and 
unreasonable r a t e s . " ) . Mountain Bell failed to squarely address th i s 
argument or the decisions ci ted by MCI. 
While Mountain Bell continues to r e s i s t th i s Request for Agency 
Action, ratepayers in other s ta tes continue to benefit from ra te reductions 
and refunds. Recent decisions in Michigan and North Carolina underscore 
the unreasonableness of Mountain Be l l ' s posi t ion. See Consumerfs Power Co. 
v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 181 Mich. App. 2d 261, 448 N.W.2d 806, 808-810 
(1989) (approving rate" reductions and refunds); U t i l . Comm. v. Nantahala 
Power & Light Co., 326 N.C. 190, 388 S.E.2d 118, 127 (1990) (approving ra te 
reductions and refunds). 
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F i n a l l y , Mountain Bell urges t h a t the Court adopt a 
r e s t r i c t i v e reading of the terms "unjus t or un reasonab le . " 
Relying on Cheltenham & Abinqton Sewage Co. v . Pa. Pub l ic 
U t i l . Comm'n, 344 Pa. 366, 25 A.2d 334, c e r t , denied, 317 U.S. 
588 (1942) , Mountain Bel l argues t h a t the r e p a r a t i o n s s t a t u t e 
only a p p l i e s if a r a t e "has been approved p rev ious ly by the 
commission in a f i n a l order but has l a t e r been found, a f t e r 
hea r i ng , to be un jus t and un reasonab le . " Mountain Bel l Br ief , 
a t 46. I t i s apparent from Cheltenham and Mountain B e l l ' s 
argument t h a t t h i s reading of "unjus t or unreasonable" has 
been superseded by Utah ' s s t ay pending appeal s t a t u t e , Utah 
Code Ann. S 5 4 - 7 - 1 7 . 1 6 
The cases c i t e d by Mountain Bel l demonstrate only 
t h a t the ru l e aga in s t r e t r o a c t i v e ratemaking may p r o h i b i t a 
r e g u l a t o r y commission from a r b i t r a r i l y changing i t s mind as to 
what i s " r e a s o n a b l e . " For example, the Commission would be 
p r o h i b i t e d from making a r e t r o a c t i v e de te rmina t ion t h a t 13.0%, 
r a t h e r than 14.2% should have been the r a t e of r e t u r n for 
1 6
 Similarly, neither State ex r e l . Boynton v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 135 
Kan. 491, 11 P.2d 999 (1932) nor State ex r e l . Standard Oil Co. v. Dep't of 
Public Works, 185 Wash. 235, 53 P.2d 318 (1936) (cited by Mountain Bell 
Brief, at 46-47) require a narrow reading of section 54-7-20. In Boynton, 
the focus of the decision was on the Constitutional implications of a 
reparations s t a tu t e . These arguments have been dealt with supra at 8-9. 
In Standard Oil, the court addressed a question of timing that i s deal t 
with exp l i c i t ly in Utah Code Ann. S 54-7-20(2) which provides a brief 
one-year s ta tu te of l imitat ions for claims of reparations for unjust, 
unreasonable or discriminatory charges. 
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Mountain Bell since 1985. But the rule does not prohibit the 
Commission from taking notice, and acting on, a fundamental 
and significant change in economic circumstances, e.g., a 
dramatic cut in federal taxes. The seemingly contradictory 
authority cited by Mountain Bell and MCI can be reconciled 
around this general principle. Where previously approved 
rates have been rendered unreasonable by a dramatic and 
unexpected change in circumstances, courts and commissions 
have consistently found a path around the rule against retro-
active ratemaking whether by statute, judicial exception or 
simply characterizing their actions as "not ratemaking." 
D. The Commission May Order Reparations Where Signifi-
cant Utility Profits or Losses Result From "Extraor-
dinary and Unforeseen" Events. 
Mountain Bell urges that the exception for extraor-
dinary and unforeseen events is not applicable, relying 
primarily on the argument that the 86 Tax Act cannot be 
17 
characterized as an unforeseen event. Mountain Bell fails 
to respond to the authority cited by Mountain Bell which 
indicated that the dramatic tax cut was precisely the kind of 
"unforeseen" event for which the exception was created. MCI 
17
 Mountain Bell also argues that only a "handful" of jurisdictions have 
adopted the exception. Mountain Bell Brief, at 49. MCI has demonstrated 
that the exception has met with widespread approval. MCI Opening Brief, at 
36-41. More significantly, Mountain Bell has failed to identify a single 
jurisdiction which has considered the exception and then flatly rejected 
it. 
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Opening Brief, at 38-41; see Carolina Power & Light Co, v. 
FERC, 860 F.2d 1097, 1102 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (tax cut was "only 
marginally more foreseeable than an act of God"). Nor does 
Mountain Bell respond to the decisions cited by MCI which have 
applied the exception to allow recovery of tax increases and 
unexpected fees. MCI Opening Brief, at 38-39. 
MCI has demonstrated at length that it is unreason-
able to allow Mountain Bell to collect federal taxes at a 46% 
rate and pay them at 34%. See supra note 15. Mountain Bell 
is unresponsive, except to argue that any overearnings are the 
result of "misstep" in the regulatory process and that recov-
ery is barred by the rule against retroactive ratemaking. 
Mountain Bell concedes the fact of excessive earnings, but 
claims the Commission is powerless to correct the problem. 
Mountain Bell's argument proceeds from a mistaken premise. 
The Company's excessive earnings resulted not from regulatory 
error (nor from cost savings or management efficiencies) but 
from a Congressional decision to reduce income taxes. When 
the Commission set Mountain Bell's rates in 1985, it could not 
have predicted the tax cut. Thus, the overearnings are the 
result of an unforeseen event and the decisions considering 
that exception to the rule against retroactive ratemaking are 
directly applicable. 
Mountain Bell also argues that the responses of 
other states to the 86 Tax Act are irrelevant because other 
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states acted prospectively to protect ratepayers. Mountain 
Bell attempts to dismiss these actions by mischaracterizing 
their purpose. MCI does not argue that the responses of other 
states to the 86 Tax Act demonstrate an exception to the rule 
against retroactive ratemaking. That is amply demonstrated by 
other authority. Instead, these actions establish two impor-
tant points. First, they suggest that, in the national 
regulatory climate of 1986 and 1987, Mountain Bell's position 
before the Commission that the 86 Tax Act would not materially 
increase its earnings was disingenuous at best, and, at worst 
misleading. Second, these decisions confirm that Mountain 
Bell's rates—based on the 46% tax rate—were inherently 
unjust and unreasonable. 
E. The Rule Against Retroactive Ratemaking Only Applies 
in General Ratemaking Proceedings. 
MCI has demonstrated that the rule against retroac-
tive ratemaking has been applied only when the regulatory 
authority is engaged in ratemaking. MCI Opening Brief, at 
32-36. Mountain Bell does not dispute this principle, but 
responds by arguing that the fuel adjustment clause cases 
cited by MCI are distinguishable. Mountain Bell Brief, at 
52-54. Mountain Bell's argument is not responsive. The fuel 
adjustment clauses are simply the most common application of 
the general principle and the reasoning of those cases is both 
applicable and instructive. Federal tax expenses, like fuel 
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costs, are recoverable by the utility. The utility is not 
entitled to a rate of return on those costs. See Pike County 
Light & Power v. Public Util. Commfn, 87 Pa. Cmmwlth. 451, 487 
A.2d 118, 120 (1985). Mountain Bell's attempts to distinguish 
federal tax expenses are unconvincing. Many of the commis-
sions that acted to reduce utility rates based on the 86 Tax 
Act relied on the reasoning that Mountain Bell urges the Court 
to reject. See, e.g., Consumers Power Co., 448 N.W.2d at 809 
("The PSC . . . essentially ordered Consumers to refund money 
collected from its ratepayers which was in excess of what 
Consumers was going to pay in taxes. The money refunded in 
reality already belonged to the ratepayers."); Re Hawaiian 
Elec. Co., 102 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 157, 159 (Hawaii Pub. 
Util. Comm. 1989) ("There is no dispute that electric rates 
reflect the income taxes which [the utility] is required to 
pay and that, thus, it is the ratepayers who ultimately pay 
such taxes. Any benefit to be derived from the lowering of 
the income tax rate should, therefore, accrue to the 
ratepayers."); see also MCI Opening Brief, at 23-25 (citing 
additional cases) . 
CONCLUSION 
The Commission prematurely rejected the Request for 
Agency Action and refused to perform the investigation 
required by Utah law. Petitioners are entitled to an 
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investigation of their claim that rates charges by Mountain 
Bell were unjust or unreasonable as a result of the 86 Tax 
Act. 
The rule against retroactive ratemaking is no bar to 
such an investigation or to an order of reparations. Utah law 
authorizes reparations for unjust or unreasonable charges; 
prolonged overcollection of federal taxes is both unjust and 
unreasonable. Most of the states that have adopted the rule 
against retroactive ratemaking have also adopted a judicial 
exception for unforeseen or extraordinary costs and profits. 
The overearnings the flowed from the 86 Tax Act were both 
unforeseen and extraordinary. Petitioners are also entitled 
to an investigation of Mountain Bell's conduct to determine if 
Mountain Bell should be estopped from relying on the rule in 
this case. 
MCI asks the Court to remand the Request for Agency 
Action to the Commission with an order to investigate Mountain 
Bell's earnings and conduct during the relevant period and, if 
that investigation shows that the rates charged were unjust or 
unreasonable, to order appropriate reparations. 
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Tab A 
Chapter 43 LAWS OF UTAH 59 
CHAPTER 43. 
Senate Bill No. 47. 
Passed March 14, 1929. Approved March 22, 1929. In effect May 14, 1929.) 
COMPLAINTS FOR REPARATIONS BEFORE PUBLIC UTILITIES 
COMMISSION. 
An Act to amend Section 4838, Compiled Laws of Utah, 1917, relating to 
complaints for reparations filed before the Public Utilities Com-
mission. 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah: 
SECTION 1. Section amended. Section 4838, Compiled Laws of Utah, 
1917, is amended to read as follows: 
4838. Reparation—courts to enforce order—limitations. 1. When 
complaint has been made to the commission concerning any rate, fare, 
toll, rental, or charge for any product or commodity furnished or service 
performed by any public utility, and the commission has found, after 
investigation, that the public utility has charged an amount for such 
product, commodity, or service in excess of the schedules, rates, and 
tariffs on file with the commission, or has charged an unjust, unreason-
able, or discriminatory amount against the complainant, the commission 
may order that the public utility make due reparation to the complainant 
therefor, with interest from the date of collection; 
2. If the public utility does not comply with the order for the pay-
ment of reparation within the time specified in such order, suit may be 
instituted in any court of competent jurisdiction to recover the same. 
All complaints concerning unjust, unreasonable, or discriminatory charges 
shall be filed with the commission within one year, and those concerning 
charges in excess of the schedules, rates, and tariffs on file with the 
commission shall be filed with the commission within two years, from the 
time the cause of action accrues, and the petition for the enforcement 
of any order shall be filed in the court within one year from the date 
of the order of the commission. The remedy in this section provided 
shall be cumulative and in addition to any other remedy or remedies in 
this title in case of failure of a public utility to obey an order or decision 
of the commission. 
Sec. 2. Not to apply to joint rates. This Act shall not apply to 
divisions on joint rates and charges between carriers. 
Approved March 22, 1929. 
